Friday, January 19, 2007
Transcript Senator Barbara Boxer and Secretary Rice 2007-01-11 Sen-FRC The Administration Policy on Iraq
Fortunately, I don't have to transcribe this one. It has been published in full several places, search for it or try the copy at the New York Times Jan 11 2007.
Thursday, January 18, 2007
Transcript Senator Chris Dodd and Secretary Rice 2007-01-11 Sen-FRC
This is a transcript of the entire exchange between Senator Chris Dodd (D-Connecticut) and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, appearing at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing 10:00 AM Thursday 11 January, 2007. A website for this meeting, titled The Administration's Plan for Iraq (has just moved from Jan 16 '07) carries streaming video of the entire proceeding. I prepared this transcript as best I could from a video recording. You might also find Sen. Dodd's prepared opening remarks on his website here, but what I found there was not the entire opening remarks, nor the Q&A exchange.
Linguistic pieces that stand out here: Sen. Dodd quotes Churchill on "fool's paradise;" the term "supplicant" (as in U.S. not wanting to appear to be one) appears in Secretary Rice's remarks.
[Sen. Chris Dodd (D-Connecticut)]
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you Madame Secretary. Let me thank you as well, we have had some conversations over the last couple of weeks prior to the trip that Sen. Kerry and I took to the region and then on the return as well. I thank you for that, and I thank you for being here this morning. And again I thank the chairman for holding the series of hearings we are going to have on this subject matter that offer, I hope, an opportunity for us to not only listen to you, as we did the President last evening, but also an opportunity for you to hear from us as well.
I think it's important that there be a conversation here as we try to sort out this policy and begin to make sense of it. It's not about Democrats and Republicans, it's about getting this right. And I couldn't agree more with Sen. Biden, I don't know of another foreign policy crisis that's been as compelling as this one. Over the past 32 years as a member of the house, and as a member of this body, and a member of this committee for a quarter of a century, I've never been to a region where it's felt it was more in crisis that it is today, and at greater risk. I'd like to share just some opening thoughts and comments and then get to a quick question.
On the eve of the Second World War, the twentieth century's most daunting and difficult struggle, Winston Churchill explained in the following words a compelling thought. He said,
"There is no worse mistake in public leadership than to hold out false hopes soon to be swept away. [People] can face peril or misfortune with fortitude and buoyancy, but they bitterly resent being deceived or finding that those responsible for their affairs are themselves dwelling in a fool's paradise."
Madame Secretary, I'm sorry to say today, and I think many hold this view, that a fools paradise describes nothing as aptly as our Iraq policy today. I think most Americans know it painfully; the Iraqi people, of course, know this in compelling numbers. If the president did grasp, I think, the sad extent of that failure, I sincerely doubt he would have ordered yet more troops into Iraq. The President's plan simply strikes me as a continuation of Operation Together Forward which has been described already, which far from improving Iraq's security climate produced the unintended consequences of heightened sectarian violence.
I fail to see, and I think many others share this view, that the outcome will be different this time. And that is a true disservice to the American troops, which have shown nothing other than professionalism and courage, and they should not be asked to risk their lives for an unsound strategy, and an unsound and unsure purpose.
The Baker-Hamilton report should have disabused us of the notion that, caught in the midst of sectarian, ethnic, and religious political hatreds, we can simply bludgeon our way to victory. As many have been saying for some time now, only political and diplomatic possibilities hold out any real hope of reversing this spiral into chaos.
The time for blunt force I think is long past, and many hold that view. Instead, we ought to withdraw, I think, our combat troops from these large urban area of sectarian conflict, where they simply are cannon fodder. There are twenty three militias operating in Baghdad alone. It's hard to identify exactly who is the enemy here. We have Shi'ias and Sunnis, you have Ba'athists, you have insurgents, some al-Qaeda elements. Here, asking our military people to sort out who the enemy is in all of this is extremely difficult, to put it mildly.
Instead, we ought to be focusing our attention on training reliable Iraqi security forces, providing some security at the border areas, and as several of our junior officers that I talked with in Baghdad suggested, providing the kind of security around some of these critical infrastructure areas that provide the kind of water, sewage, electrical grids, that is so critical to people having some sense of opportunity, or hope for the future.
If the only solution to Iraq is a political one, then diplomacy happens to be the weapon that we have left and must use. The President's solution to all of this is to ignore the most important recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, namely, robust diplomacy, and instead must settle instead on an escalation of our current combat strategy. This is a tactic in search of a strategy in my view, and will not bring us a more stable Iraq.
The American people have spent 14 billion dollars training and equipping three hundred thousand Iraqi police and security forces. As I've said a moment ago, 23 separate sectarian militias operate with impunity throughout Baghdad alone. Sectarian killings continue, largely unabated, averaging scores of deaths every day, thousands a month.
This is not random violence. This is targeted civil war, complete with ethnic cleansing. Those of us who have been to Iraq recently have seen it with our own eyes, heard it with our own ears.
Beyond that, the President's own intelligence experts have told us that the Islamic world is growing more radical, and that the terrorist threat is greater today than it was in nine-eleven. Not despite, but because of the continuing war in Iraq. Their conclusion: it has become the physical and ideological training ground for the next generation of extremists.
The wider region has been further plunged into violence, we know: Hezbollah has crippled the Lebanese government, civil war in the Palestinian territories now seems more likely than ever, Syria and Iran are more powerful and emboldened than they have been in recent memory. We are farther away from stabilizing Afghanistan, as drug traffickers and tribals warfare now threaten to destroy its nascent democracy, and the Taliban is growing stronger by the hour.
And perhaps most troubling of all is our standing in the world. According to the Pew Center for Global Opinion, most people in Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, India and China think that the war in Iraq is a greater danger to world peace than either Iran or North Korea. Stunning as those numbers are, the President says we are in a war of ideas. But how can we possibly win that kind of a war, between democracy and extremism, when so much of the world considers us to be the threat? It's deeply troubling to me, as I hope it is to you as well.
How weakened is our standing in the world and our support from foreign peoples? How may tools have we thrown away, and how safe are we now?
Senator Lugar raised an important question in his opening comments that I would like you to address if you can. And that is, none of us are suggesting at this table that we engage Iran or Syriaas if they were an ally, or a friend. We are talking about conferences where we give them a status that they do not deserve.
But it's awfully difficult to understand, Madame Secretary, why we would not try to engage very directly with people here whocould play a critical role in providing some stability. We heard in Syria the president say that he is interested in a secular Arab state operating on his border. He does not want a Shi'ia dominated fundamentalist state on his border. That was just a comment to us in the room with embassy personnel present.
It seems to me it's worth examining and exploring those areas where we can have a common ground here rather than just neglecting or ignoring that kind of an offer if we are going to bring stability to the region.
I wish you'd once again address again, the issue raised by Senator Lugar in the context in which he raised it. Not diplomacy as a favor or a gift, or some acknowledgement that we agree with these people, but rather the necessity for the United States to lead in a region where we have not been able to do so.
[Secretary Rice]
Thank you Senator, let me address the question first Iran and Syria. And they are different. And I think we need to separate the two. First of all, on Syria. We did engage. For quite a long time. Colin Powell engaged. Rich Armitage engaged. Bill Burns engaged. And in fact, we got nowhere. And indeed I would argue that the situation from our point ofview is worst today, in terms of the terms on which we would be engaging, than it was at that time.
The terms on which we would be engaging now, and on which we are being asked to engage, is that we go to the Syrians and say, help us to stabilize Iraq, or, lets join in our common interest to stabilize Iraq. That's what we would say to them.
The problem of course, is that if they have an interest in stabilizing Iraq, I assume that they will do it on the basis of their national interest, and that they will do it because it is in their national interest. To do anything more with them is to suggest that a trade-off is possible. You help us stabilize in Iraq, and perhaps we will overlook some of your activities in Lebanon. You help us stabilize in Iraq, perhaps we can do something to shave some of the teeth from the tribunal.
I think it's extremely important to note that we have talked to the Syrians, we've generally gotten nowhere, and now we would be going in a way that I would fear looks like a supplicant.
[Sen. Chris Dodd]
Can I just ask you, Madame Secretary, is that speculation on your part...
[Secretary Rice]
No...
[Sen. Chris Dodd]
... or has that been the reaction you have heard?
[Secretary Rice]
Well I would also just note that an awful lot of people have engaged the Syrians recently to no good effect. The Italians, the Germans, the British, all engaged them.
[Sen. Chris Dodd]
How about us?
[Secretary Rice]
Senator Dodd, if I really thought that the Syrians didn't know how to help stabilize Iraq and we needed to tell them, then perhaps that would be worth doing. They know how to stabilize Iraq, they just need to stop allowing terrorists to cross their borders.
[Sen. Chris Dodd]
Thank you. [time has run out].
[Secretary Rice]
Shall I go to Iran? Because I do think they are different. When it comes to Iran... First of all there is a twenty-seven year history of not engaging Iran, so this would be a major shift in policy. Of course we did talk to them about Afghanistan, when that made sense.
But what we are looking at, again, is an Iran that is engaging activities to try to kill our troops. They know how to stop that. They know how to stop it tomorrow. They know how to stop destabilizing the young Iraqi government. And I assume that if they believe it's in their interest, they would do so.
But I just don't believe for a moment that the conversation with the Iranians is going to in the following way, "help us stabilize Iraq," and they don't want to talk about a price on their nuclear program.
We are, I think, dealing with Iran in the proper fashion. Which is to insist with the rest of the international community, that any negotiations with Iran are going to be on the basis of suspension of their nuclear program. We are reaching out to the Iranian people. We just had a group of Iranian medical doctors here. In exchange we will have some American sports teams go there.
We are making it difficult for Iran to continue its policies of terrorism and WMD pursuit, because we are sanctioning, and designating their banks that are engaged in those activities. And it is having an effect, on whether people are willing to invest in Iran, whether they are willing to take the reputational [sic] risk of handling Iranian assets. That's why banks are leaving Iran, that's why they are having trouble finding a way to support their investment in their oil and gas industry. We do have a pretty comprehensive way of dealing with Iran.
I have made the offer. If they are prepared to suspend their enrichment capability, I'm there. With their people at any time they would like, in any place they would like. But I think that that's the proper context.
And finally, we do have the opportunity, within the International Compact,
to have Iran and Syria play a positive role in Iraq if they wish to do it. They have been at those meetings of the International Compact and they should play a positive role. And so I don't think there is an absence of diplomacy, an absence of policy toward Iran and Syria. It's just that direct negotiations on this matter put us in the role of supplicant, and I think that's a problem.
[Chairman]
Thank you.
[During the Dr. Rice's concluding remarks, a male demonstrator who has held up a small cloth sign is addressed, and shortley after, during Sen. Hagel's statement, is removed, shouting while being dragged up the aisle. The time clock is reset.]
Linguistic pieces that stand out here: Sen. Dodd quotes Churchill on "fool's paradise;" the term "supplicant" (as in U.S. not wanting to appear to be one) appears in Secretary Rice's remarks.
[Sen. Chris Dodd (D-Connecticut)]
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you Madame Secretary. Let me thank you as well, we have had some conversations over the last couple of weeks prior to the trip that Sen. Kerry and I took to the region and then on the return as well. I thank you for that, and I thank you for being here this morning. And again I thank the chairman for holding the series of hearings we are going to have on this subject matter that offer, I hope, an opportunity for us to not only listen to you, as we did the President last evening, but also an opportunity for you to hear from us as well.
I think it's important that there be a conversation here as we try to sort out this policy and begin to make sense of it. It's not about Democrats and Republicans, it's about getting this right. And I couldn't agree more with Sen. Biden, I don't know of another foreign policy crisis that's been as compelling as this one. Over the past 32 years as a member of the house, and as a member of this body, and a member of this committee for a quarter of a century, I've never been to a region where it's felt it was more in crisis that it is today, and at greater risk. I'd like to share just some opening thoughts and comments and then get to a quick question.
On the eve of the Second World War, the twentieth century's most daunting and difficult struggle, Winston Churchill explained in the following words a compelling thought. He said,
Madame Secretary, I'm sorry to say today, and I think many hold this view, that a fools paradise describes nothing as aptly as our Iraq policy today. I think most Americans know it painfully; the Iraqi people, of course, know this in compelling numbers. If the president did grasp, I think, the sad extent of that failure, I sincerely doubt he would have ordered yet more troops into Iraq. The President's plan simply strikes me as a continuation of Operation Together Forward which has been described already, which far from improving Iraq's security climate produced the unintended consequences of heightened sectarian violence.
I fail to see, and I think many others share this view, that the outcome will be different this time. And that is a true disservice to the American troops, which have shown nothing other than professionalism and courage, and they should not be asked to risk their lives for an unsound strategy, and an unsound and unsure purpose.
The Baker-Hamilton report should have disabused us of the notion that, caught in the midst of sectarian, ethnic, and religious political hatreds, we can simply bludgeon our way to victory. As many have been saying for some time now, only political and diplomatic possibilities hold out any real hope of reversing this spiral into chaos.
The time for blunt force I think is long past, and many hold that view. Instead, we ought to withdraw, I think, our combat troops from these large urban area of sectarian conflict, where they simply are cannon fodder. There are twenty three militias operating in Baghdad alone. It's hard to identify exactly who is the enemy here. We have Shi'ias and Sunnis, you have Ba'athists, you have insurgents, some al-Qaeda elements. Here, asking our military people to sort out who the enemy is in all of this is extremely difficult, to put it mildly.
Instead, we ought to be focusing our attention on training reliable Iraqi security forces, providing some security at the border areas, and as several of our junior officers that I talked with in Baghdad suggested, providing the kind of security around some of these critical infrastructure areas that provide the kind of water, sewage, electrical grids, that is so critical to people having some sense of opportunity, or hope for the future.
If the only solution to Iraq is a political one, then diplomacy happens to be the weapon that we have left and must use. The President's solution to all of this is to ignore the most important recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, namely, robust diplomacy, and instead must settle instead on an escalation of our current combat strategy. This is a tactic in search of a strategy in my view, and will not bring us a more stable Iraq.
The American people have spent 14 billion dollars training and equipping three hundred thousand Iraqi police and security forces. As I've said a moment ago, 23 separate sectarian militias operate with impunity throughout Baghdad alone. Sectarian killings continue, largely unabated, averaging scores of deaths every day, thousands a month.
This is not random violence. This is targeted civil war, complete with ethnic cleansing. Those of us who have been to Iraq recently have seen it with our own eyes, heard it with our own ears.
Beyond that, the President's own intelligence experts have told us that the Islamic world is growing more radical, and that the terrorist threat is greater today than it was in nine-eleven. Not despite, but because of the continuing war in Iraq. Their conclusion: it has become the physical and ideological training ground for the next generation of extremists.
The wider region has been further plunged into violence, we know: Hezbollah has crippled the Lebanese government, civil war in the Palestinian territories now seems more likely than ever, Syria and Iran are more powerful and emboldened than they have been in recent memory. We are farther away from stabilizing Afghanistan, as drug traffickers and tribals warfare now threaten to destroy its nascent democracy, and the Taliban is growing stronger by the hour.
And perhaps most troubling of all is our standing in the world. According to the Pew Center for Global Opinion, most people in Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, Indonesia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, India and China think that the war in Iraq is a greater danger to world peace than either Iran or North Korea. Stunning as those numbers are, the President says we are in a war of ideas. But how can we possibly win that kind of a war, between democracy and extremism, when so much of the world considers us to be the threat? It's deeply troubling to me, as I hope it is to you as well.
How weakened is our standing in the world and our support from foreign peoples? How may tools have we thrown away, and how safe are we now?
Senator Lugar raised an important question in his opening comments that I would like you to address if you can. And that is, none of us are suggesting at this table that we engage Iran or Syriaas if they were an ally, or a friend. We are talking about conferences where we give them a status that they do not deserve.
But it's awfully difficult to understand, Madame Secretary, why we would not try to engage very directly with people here whocould play a critical role in providing some stability. We heard in Syria the president say that he is interested in a secular Arab state operating on his border. He does not want a Shi'ia dominated fundamentalist state on his border. That was just a comment to us in the room with embassy personnel present.
It seems to me it's worth examining and exploring those areas where we can have a common ground here rather than just neglecting or ignoring that kind of an offer if we are going to bring stability to the region.
I wish you'd once again address again, the issue raised by Senator Lugar in the context in which he raised it. Not diplomacy as a favor or a gift, or some acknowledgement that we agree with these people, but rather the necessity for the United States to lead in a region where we have not been able to do so.
[Secretary Rice]
Thank you Senator, let me address the question first Iran and Syria. And they are different. And I think we need to separate the two. First of all, on Syria. We did engage. For quite a long time. Colin Powell engaged. Rich Armitage engaged. Bill Burns engaged. And in fact, we got nowhere. And indeed I would argue that the situation from our point ofview is worst today, in terms of the terms on which we would be engaging, than it was at that time.
The terms on which we would be engaging now, and on which we are being asked to engage, is that we go to the Syrians and say, help us to stabilize Iraq, or, lets join in our common interest to stabilize Iraq. That's what we would say to them.
The problem of course, is that if they have an interest in stabilizing Iraq, I assume that they will do it on the basis of their national interest, and that they will do it because it is in their national interest. To do anything more with them is to suggest that a trade-off is possible. You help us stabilize in Iraq, and perhaps we will overlook some of your activities in Lebanon. You help us stabilize in Iraq, perhaps we can do something to shave some of the teeth from the tribunal.
I think it's extremely important to note that we have talked to the Syrians, we've generally gotten nowhere, and now we would be going in a way that I would fear looks like a supplicant.
[Sen. Chris Dodd]
Can I just ask you, Madame Secretary, is that speculation on your part...
[Secretary Rice]
No...
[Sen. Chris Dodd]
... or has that been the reaction you have heard?
[Secretary Rice]
Well I would also just note that an awful lot of people have engaged the Syrians recently to no good effect. The Italians, the Germans, the British, all engaged them.
[Sen. Chris Dodd]
How about us?
[Secretary Rice]
Senator Dodd, if I really thought that the Syrians didn't know how to help stabilize Iraq and we needed to tell them, then perhaps that would be worth doing. They know how to stabilize Iraq, they just need to stop allowing terrorists to cross their borders.
[Sen. Chris Dodd]
Thank you. [time has run out].
[Secretary Rice]
Shall I go to Iran? Because I do think they are different. When it comes to Iran... First of all there is a twenty-seven year history of not engaging Iran, so this would be a major shift in policy. Of course we did talk to them about Afghanistan, when that made sense.
But what we are looking at, again, is an Iran that is engaging activities to try to kill our troops. They know how to stop that. They know how to stop it tomorrow. They know how to stop destabilizing the young Iraqi government. And I assume that if they believe it's in their interest, they would do so.
But I just don't believe for a moment that the conversation with the Iranians is going to in the following way, "help us stabilize Iraq," and they don't want to talk about a price on their nuclear program.
We are, I think, dealing with Iran in the proper fashion. Which is to insist with the rest of the international community, that any negotiations with Iran are going to be on the basis of suspension of their nuclear program. We are reaching out to the Iranian people. We just had a group of Iranian medical doctors here. In exchange we will have some American sports teams go there.
We are making it difficult for Iran to continue its policies of terrorism and WMD pursuit, because we are sanctioning, and designating their banks that are engaged in those activities. And it is having an effect, on whether people are willing to invest in Iran, whether they are willing to take the reputational [sic] risk of handling Iranian assets. That's why banks are leaving Iran, that's why they are having trouble finding a way to support their investment in their oil and gas industry. We do have a pretty comprehensive way of dealing with Iran.
I have made the offer. If they are prepared to suspend their enrichment capability, I'm there. With their people at any time they would like, in any place they would like. But I think that that's the proper context.
And finally, we do have the opportunity, within the International Compact,
to have Iran and Syria play a positive role in Iraq if they wish to do it. They have been at those meetings of the International Compact and they should play a positive role. And so I don't think there is an absence of diplomacy, an absence of policy toward Iran and Syria. It's just that direct negotiations on this matter put us in the role of supplicant, and I think that's a problem.
[Chairman]
Thank you.
[During the Dr. Rice's concluding remarks, a male demonstrator who has held up a small cloth sign is addressed, and shortley after, during Sen. Hagel's statement, is removed, shouting while being dragged up the aisle. The time clock is reset.]
Transcript Senator Dick Lugar and Secretary Rice: 2007-01-11, Sen-FRC, The Administration's Plan for Iraq
This is a transcript of the entire exchange between Senator Richard (Dick) Lugar (R-Indiana) and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, appearing at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing 10:00 AM Thursday 11 January, 2007. A website for this meeting, titled The Administration's Plan for Iraq (has just moved from Jan 16 '07) carries streaming video of the entire proceeding. I prepared this transcript as best I could from a video recording. From Jan 2003 through Dec. 2006 Senator Lugar was the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and as of Jan 2006 is the ranking Republican leader on the committee. His website has a section elevating the Iraq policy debate with
a batch of policy letters on Iraq.
Interesting topics: dissecting the facts behind David Brooks' column titled "The Fog over Iraq," in the NYT 11 Jan 2007 (which may be more accessible here in the IHT); the 'side surge' of 4,000 American troops to Anbar province; the 1,100 Sons of Anbar.
[Sen. Dick Lugar (R-Indiana)]
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rice, in the New York Times today, columnist David Brooks, in a column called The Fog over Iraq, presents information that I simply wanted your comment. Because you have indicated that you have visited with Prime Minister Maliki. And the article by David Brooks references the meeting of our President with Prime Minister Maliki on November 30th, in which purportedly Maliki presented a plan in which our troops would go to the periphery of Baghdad, would fight off insurgents---Sunni insurgents or whoever---trying to penetrate Baghdad. But the Iraqi army and police, including Shi'ites and Kurds, principally, would take over the responsibility of attempting to clear the city. Essentially, Brooks says President Bush rejected that plan---or our government did and the President as the head of it has indicated this---and decided that indeed we would do the opposite. American troops, and the additional troops, would come into Baghdad, would be embedded in the nine police districts. And would in fact be more heavily involved, whether door-to-door, and there certainly are disputes over whether that's the case, the thought is no, not door-to-door, that the Shiites go door-to-door, essentially, and that we are back, in the background, advising, and supporting, and so forth.
But the article goes on to suggest that in fact, or gives the impression that, Makili and Kurds and the Shi'ites had at least an idea of creating their own kind of stability. Now from our own standpoint, this might have rejected the Sunnis as a partner in the process, and that's led to greater destabilization of the country as a whole.
Let me just ask for your comment, as to whether this is the sequence of events that transpired into the plan that the President gave last night. And what are the strengths and dangers of that.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Yes, Senator Lugar, the core of the Maliki plan has really been preserved here. This really is based on his plan.
It is absolutely the case that the Iraqis have wanted to have responsibility for their own problem, to have their troops under their command, and to move out. When Prime Minister Maliki presented the plan, he wanted our people to look at it with his military people, to see how quickly this could be accelerated, so that he could go and take care of the sectarian problem in Baghdad.
The fact is, it could not be accelerated quickly enough with only Iraqi forces in order to meet the timeline that he really felt he had in terms of dealing with the Baghdad problem. And so, out of this planning process came, from our generals, the view that we needed to augment their forces as embeds---as, by the way, the Baker-Hamilton commission recommends---as people who can help them in a sense with on-the-job training, who can help them to kind of solidify their ability to go after this. But the Iraqis continue to press that they really need to be the ones interfacing with their population in a major way. They need to be the ones to deliver the stability that is needed.
I think you will see that in a relatively brief period of time, as their forces develop, they will take on more and more. And as the President said last night, the thought is they would have all their forces by November [ed? meaning, 2007?]. But there was a gap in time between the time that they need to get Baghdad under control and having the capability to do it. Even bringing, as they are, their best and most reliable army forces from around the country.
So that's the difference. But I don't believe that it was ever really the prime minister's intention that it would be Shi'ia and Kurds, only. I think he understands that one of the problems that they have is that the Sunni population feels that the Iraqi government is not even-handed in dealing with death squads.
[Sen. Dick Lugar]
What can you tell us about favorable reception of some of the sheiks, in Anbar province, of our new policies. Can you describe that situation.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Yes. Well, the last time that there was some kind of report about Anbar, remember some of the reporting as being the tremendous difficulties in Anbar. And it is a difficult place because it is the epicenter of al-Qaeda. Now what you will hear from our commanders in the area, and also I have heard directly from my provincial reconstruction team leader, a very seasoned diplomat, is that the sheiks have essentially gotten tired of al-Qaeda, and want them out. They do not believe that we can do that alone. They have begun to recruit their own young men, to be trained to be a force against the foreign invaders. They have for instance sent eleven hundred young men to Jordan, to train for something that they call the Sons of Anbar, to come back; they will recruit more and send them. This is also part of a success, we believe, of a policy with regional neighbors, who have been involved in the Sunni outreach piece. It is into that Anbar that we believe it is important to surge both civilian and military assets. And so when the President talks about four thousand additional forces into Anbar, this is not because of a sectarian problem, this is because we think we may be able to support this local effort against al-Qaeda and secondly, to surge resources into Anbar.
To be very frank, the chairman asked me if I was confident about the Iraqi government. [ed: Refers to earlier question from Sen. Joseph Biden] I am confident that they want to do this. I am also one who knows there have been times when they haven't performed in the past. And one of the things that they've got to perform better on is getting economic resources into some of the Sunni areas, particularly into Anbar. And so we are also going to increase the number of provincial reconstruction teams in Anbar to help with that process.
[Sen. Dick Lugar]
Thank you.
a batch of policy letters on Iraq.
Interesting topics: dissecting the facts behind David Brooks' column titled "The Fog over Iraq," in the NYT 11 Jan 2007 (which may be more accessible here in the IHT); the 'side surge' of 4,000 American troops to Anbar province; the 1,100 Sons of Anbar.
[Sen. Dick Lugar (R-Indiana)]
Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Rice, in the New York Times today, columnist David Brooks, in a column called The Fog over Iraq, presents information that I simply wanted your comment. Because you have indicated that you have visited with Prime Minister Maliki. And the article by David Brooks references the meeting of our President with Prime Minister Maliki on November 30th, in which purportedly Maliki presented a plan in which our troops would go to the periphery of Baghdad, would fight off insurgents---Sunni insurgents or whoever---trying to penetrate Baghdad. But the Iraqi army and police, including Shi'ites and Kurds, principally, would take over the responsibility of attempting to clear the city. Essentially, Brooks says President Bush rejected that plan---or our government did and the President as the head of it has indicated this---and decided that indeed we would do the opposite. American troops, and the additional troops, would come into Baghdad, would be embedded in the nine police districts. And would in fact be more heavily involved, whether door-to-door, and there certainly are disputes over whether that's the case, the thought is no, not door-to-door, that the Shiites go door-to-door, essentially, and that we are back, in the background, advising, and supporting, and so forth.
But the article goes on to suggest that in fact, or gives the impression that, Makili and Kurds and the Shi'ites had at least an idea of creating their own kind of stability. Now from our own standpoint, this might have rejected the Sunnis as a partner in the process, and that's led to greater destabilization of the country as a whole.
Let me just ask for your comment, as to whether this is the sequence of events that transpired into the plan that the President gave last night. And what are the strengths and dangers of that.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Yes, Senator Lugar, the core of the Maliki plan has really been preserved here. This really is based on his plan.
It is absolutely the case that the Iraqis have wanted to have responsibility for their own problem, to have their troops under their command, and to move out. When Prime Minister Maliki presented the plan, he wanted our people to look at it with his military people, to see how quickly this could be accelerated, so that he could go and take care of the sectarian problem in Baghdad.
The fact is, it could not be accelerated quickly enough with only Iraqi forces in order to meet the timeline that he really felt he had in terms of dealing with the Baghdad problem. And so, out of this planning process came, from our generals, the view that we needed to augment their forces as embeds---as, by the way, the Baker-Hamilton commission recommends---as people who can help them in a sense with on-the-job training, who can help them to kind of solidify their ability to go after this. But the Iraqis continue to press that they really need to be the ones interfacing with their population in a major way. They need to be the ones to deliver the stability that is needed.
I think you will see that in a relatively brief period of time, as their forces develop, they will take on more and more. And as the President said last night, the thought is they would have all their forces by November [ed? meaning, 2007?]. But there was a gap in time between the time that they need to get Baghdad under control and having the capability to do it. Even bringing, as they are, their best and most reliable army forces from around the country.
So that's the difference. But I don't believe that it was ever really the prime minister's intention that it would be Shi'ia and Kurds, only. I think he understands that one of the problems that they have is that the Sunni population feels that the Iraqi government is not even-handed in dealing with death squads.
[Sen. Dick Lugar]
What can you tell us about favorable reception of some of the sheiks, in Anbar province, of our new policies. Can you describe that situation.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Yes. Well, the last time that there was some kind of report about Anbar, remember some of the reporting as being the tremendous difficulties in Anbar. And it is a difficult place because it is the epicenter of al-Qaeda. Now what you will hear from our commanders in the area, and also I have heard directly from my provincial reconstruction team leader, a very seasoned diplomat, is that the sheiks have essentially gotten tired of al-Qaeda, and want them out. They do not believe that we can do that alone. They have begun to recruit their own young men, to be trained to be a force against the foreign invaders. They have for instance sent eleven hundred young men to Jordan, to train for something that they call the Sons of Anbar, to come back; they will recruit more and send them. This is also part of a success, we believe, of a policy with regional neighbors, who have been involved in the Sunni outreach piece. It is into that Anbar that we believe it is important to surge both civilian and military assets. And so when the President talks about four thousand additional forces into Anbar, this is not because of a sectarian problem, this is because we think we may be able to support this local effort against al-Qaeda and secondly, to surge resources into Anbar.
To be very frank, the chairman asked me if I was confident about the Iraqi government. [ed: Refers to earlier question from Sen. Joseph Biden] I am confident that they want to do this. I am also one who knows there have been times when they haven't performed in the past. And one of the things that they've got to perform better on is getting economic resources into some of the Sunni areas, particularly into Anbar. And so we are also going to increase the number of provincial reconstruction teams in Anbar to help with that process.
[Sen. Dick Lugar]
Thank you.
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
Transcript Senator Menendez and Secretary Rice 2007-01-11 Sen-FRC
So, which U.S. policy is harder to measure: success in Iraq, or success with domestic school policy ("no child left behind") ? If we can have benchmarks and consequences for children's education, can we at least formulate the criteria for success in Iraq?
[Sen. Bob Menendez (D New Jersey)]
Thank you Mr. Chairman, Madame Secretary thank you for your service to the country.
I didn't vote for the war in Iraq in the first place. I believe it was one of the best decisions I ever made. And I simply don't believe that the president's escalation of the war will work. It seems to me that it's time for a political surge, not a military escalation. And I also believe it's long past time that we transition both our efforts in Iraq, our mission in Iraq particularly with our troops, and then ultimately the transition of our troops out of Iraq, in order for having the Iraqis to understand what you've talked about here, but haven't given us any benchmarks that one can measure by. And that is, to have them understand that they have to make the hard choices, compromises, negotiations, necessary for a government of national unity.
When I heard Gen. Pace last year say to us, that "we have to get the Iraqis to love their children more than they hate their neighbors." That's a powerful truism, but it does not get achieved by military might.
And so, it seems to me, to paraphrase Shakespeare, ...An escalation by any other name is an escalation. I know out of the white house it came as surge. But surge would mean temporary, and that's clearly not the case here. And ...A failed strategy, however repackaged, is still a failed strategy. We tried this plan before, and it didn't work when we sent 12,000 troops to Baghdad last summer. And we heard a panel of witnesses yesterday and there have been other military experts who have said that at this point reliable Iraqi troops aren't there simply to show up.
So you've suggested that the President has listened to a wide range of people, the Iraqi study group, the members of Congress, different military options, the American people. But, if he listened, I don't think he's heard, I don't think he's heard that wide range of views.
So I want to ask you though, even in the midst of my own views, trying to understand, what is really new about this effort? Did the President obtain a commitment from Prime Mister Maliki specifically to use Iraqi troops against Muqtada al-Sadr's troops?
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
He obtained an assurance from Prime Minister Maliki that he will go after whoever is killing innocent Iraqis, and I think they fully understand that the jaish al-Madhi are part of the problem.
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
Did he speak specifically, about, and obtain specific commitments about going against al-Sadr.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
He said that whoever they have to go after, and the military thinks they have to go after, they'll go after them.
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
The reason I ask the specific question is because it's al-Sadr who's keeping his government afloat right now.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Well actually al-Sadr and his people pulled out of the government, and the government hadn't collapsed. They pulled out as you remember because of the Amann meeting with President Bush. And I think that demonstrates that in fact they can continue to function even if the Sadr forces are not a part of the government.
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
When the president spoke to these other different... there is a broad misgiving among Shiite leaders in the government, about the Shiites having a deep seated fear that the power they won at the polls is going to be whittled away by Americans in pursuit of Sunnis... did he get their commitment to support Prime Minister Maliki?
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
I'm sorry, "their" being, the other Shi'ia?
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
The other Shi'ia leaders, the other party leaders.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Yes. The for instance [unclear ????skiri] supports Prime Minister Maliki in this effort. There is a broad ...
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
In the effort? Or to support him in his position as prime minister?
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
They support him as prime minister. They brought him to power.
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
Well, I find it really hard, unless we have a specific... I know that general view, that we will go against anyone. But isn't it in fact part of the negotiations that the president had with prime minister Maliki, is to give him more operational control. And in that operational control, couldn't he circumvent going against al-Sadr?
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
If he circumvents going against the people who are doing the killing, then he's going to fail, and his plan is going to fail. And he understands that.
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
Let's talk about that then. Let's assume that for argument's sake... let's not think about the best, the best would be great. Let's assume that he fails.
One of the problems is that benchmarks without time lines, or consequences, even the Iraq study group said that as part of their recommendation. They specifically said "if the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress towards the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, economic support for the Iraqi government."
But when I heard your response to Senator Coleman, you said, the Iraqis didn't have, you know... you go with plan "A", and if plan "A" doesn't work, then you know, you deal with it subsequently. I think that's been part of our problem here. We have a plan. But even Plan A does not have contingencies, it doesn't have benchmarks.
How can you ask the American people, and the members of Congress who represent the American people, to continue to give you a blank check without benchmarks that are definable, without benchmarks that have time lines of some consequence, without consequences to the failure to meet those deadlines. Because we've seen these benchmarks be repackaged from the past. They were benchmarks before, they were not met, there are no consequences, and we continue to create a dependency by the Iraqis on our forces.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
But Senator, first of all, I think you do one strategy at a time. But you can tell, and you can adjust a strategy as you go along. This is not going to unfold all at once. We are going to know whether or not the Iraqis are living up to their obligations, and we are going to know early on, and there are opportunities for adjustment then.
The benchmarks are actually very clear, and the Iraqis themselves have set forward some timetables for those benchmarks because they've got to get legislation through, they have an international compact that they're trying to respond to. But I just want to speak to the point of consequences.
There are consequences in that they will loose the support of the American people. And they'll loose the support of the Iraqi people.
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
But they have already been there, Madame Secretary, in terms of the support of the American people. The question is, what will our government do, specifically, if benchmarks are not met, what will we do? And that's where there is no answer, and therefore [it is] very difficult to support any such policy.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Senator, I think it's just bad policy, frankly, to speculate on what you'll do if a plan fails that you are trying to make work. I just don't think it's the way to go about it.
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
The president did it in "leave no child behind." There are real consequences if you in fact don't meet certain standards: you loose a lot of money, you get categorized as a failed school district,
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Yes, as complicated....
[Sen. Bob Menendez]
It seems to be a standard that can work here domestically. We are unwilling to give the government a standard that ultimately they would have to met in order for use to be able to achieve... whether or not to achieve success, or therefore determine what are the consequences to failure.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Senator, as complicated as education policy is, I think you're wrong. The circumstances of the Iraqis are very complicated. We're not giving... First of all, we don't expect that anyone here is giving us a blank check. I understand the skepticism. And I know that if this doesn't show some success, there isn't going to be support for this policy. I understand that. And we have said this to the Iraqis in no uncertain terms. They have to start to deliver, they have to start to deliver now, and if they don't, then I think they know that we are not going to be able to continue to support them at the levels that we do.
Where is C-SPAN3? Who actually gets it? No rural access.
As mentioned at the start, this blog is here because of Bush's "troop augmentation plan."
When that news built and then broke, I started looking for coverage of hearings during the week of January 11 2007. I found there was a slew of scheduled coverage on the obscure C-SPAN3 channel (cspan.org). For you who are not policy wonks or middle aged or have real day jobs, C-SPAN is how you can see your government in action. And you get the full coverage, commercial free, blemishes and all, not just the sound bites on the evening 1-minute news coverage. C-SPAN started with one channel that was carried gratis on cable networks as a public access project. They added C-SPAN2, and lately seem to have a loose convention of airing House of Representatives business on C-SPAN and Senate business on C-SPAN2. Then came a third channel C-SPAN3, which I notice is not carried, well, anywhere. A companion web site capitolhearings.org posts some hearing schedules, but I think not all hearings appear here.
OK. You can get some live webcasts. Darn it I have to install Real Player and open my firewall to its promiscuous and frequent upgrade proposals. But who out there has CSPAN3, either on their cable or dish access? I have Comcast cable in the pacific northwest, and cannot get it. They simply have not added it to their line-up (but new shopping/special commercial interest channels have been added often. Buy! Shop!). A family member in the plains states has DirecTV and they don't have it on that dish line-up. I can recall staying in a hotel in NY and I think I saw it there for the first time (perhaps that's Time Warner cable). So why the blackout of C-SPAN3?
What''s the beef? Why me worry? C-SPAN3 seems to be where the "real juicy" stuff of government has been aired, live, in recent weeks, in particular the House and Senate committee hearings. Since the Republican Congress seems to have been a sleeping lap dog the last 6 years, it seems fitting that since the tide turned Democratic in the House and Senate the new season of Congress is seeing a renewal of oversight, and this is interesting to watch. (OK, there's my political leanings. Satisfied?)
While the Senate and House are in session, the first two C-SPAN channels pretty much dedicate all their air time to live coverage. The only place to see the hearings live is C-SPAN3. Late at night, or after the Senate and House adjourn, other coverage can start, including the book, call-in shows, and a re-play of interesting committee hearings. But the air times for these items don't get posted to the schedule until after the Congressional bodies adjourn, so there is no fixed schedule. It's as if, during the Watergate hearings, there was a live broadcast on a mystery channel that no-one could watch, with random replays late at night on the accessible channel. The priorities are back-asswards, as I find that most live Senate/House coverage is pretty dull.
Comcast has a spot on their website to "request" channels. I did so last summer, again this month. I plan to request monthly, weekly, maybe start writing a letter. Maybe CC the letter to the FCC? But on the C-SPAN website, there is a note that there is a multi-way spat between the FCC and for-profit broadcasters and the cable and dish industry about "access." A polite way of saying they are fighting over allocation of channels and available bandwidth. These fights do not seem to stop Comcast from adding a gazillion for-profit channels that air paid advertising. But to add one more non-advertising channel seems to be more than they want to deliver.
Broadband webcasts? Sure. Except that in a lot of the rural areas, you can't get broadband. Sounds like an equal access issue to me. My family in the plains cannot get DSL, even 300-baud dial-up, because the driveway to the house is 3/4 mile, and phone line quality is poor. Back in the stone-age when I used dial-up at my Northwest suburban home, I could not get my laptop dial-up to work out there, even at 300 baud. DSL is not available there today. Cell phone reception is sketchy. Cable: forget it, they will never run cable to these areas. Satelite internet: yeah right, for a thousand dollars in equipment and $50 to $100 monthly, no.
I could hope that some day Wi-Max will get built out along the state highway and rural towns and provide broadband coverage. Or, that fiber optic will get built out to the rural areas: but the big telco's like Verizon and Sprint sold off their rural wireline subsidiaries long ago: low subscriber base per square mile, low margin business, customers not wanting to pay for the triple-play package.
When that news built and then broke, I started looking for coverage of hearings during the week of January 11 2007. I found there was a slew of scheduled coverage on the obscure C-SPAN3 channel (cspan.org). For you who are not policy wonks or middle aged or have real day jobs, C-SPAN is how you can see your government in action. And you get the full coverage, commercial free, blemishes and all, not just the sound bites on the evening 1-minute news coverage. C-SPAN started with one channel that was carried gratis on cable networks as a public access project. They added C-SPAN2, and lately seem to have a loose convention of airing House of Representatives business on C-SPAN and Senate business on C-SPAN2. Then came a third channel C-SPAN3, which I notice is not carried, well, anywhere. A companion web site capitolhearings.org posts some hearing schedules, but I think not all hearings appear here.
OK. You can get some live webcasts. Darn it I have to install Real Player and open my firewall to its promiscuous and frequent upgrade proposals. But who out there has CSPAN3, either on their cable or dish access? I have Comcast cable in the pacific northwest, and cannot get it. They simply have not added it to their line-up (but new shopping/special commercial interest channels have been added often. Buy! Shop!). A family member in the plains states has DirecTV and they don't have it on that dish line-up. I can recall staying in a hotel in NY and I think I saw it there for the first time (perhaps that's Time Warner cable). So why the blackout of C-SPAN3?
What''s the beef? Why me worry? C-SPAN3 seems to be where the "real juicy" stuff of government has been aired, live, in recent weeks, in particular the House and Senate committee hearings. Since the Republican Congress seems to have been a sleeping lap dog the last 6 years, it seems fitting that since the tide turned Democratic in the House and Senate the new season of Congress is seeing a renewal of oversight, and this is interesting to watch. (OK, there's my political leanings. Satisfied?)
While the Senate and House are in session, the first two C-SPAN channels pretty much dedicate all their air time to live coverage. The only place to see the hearings live is C-SPAN3. Late at night, or after the Senate and House adjourn, other coverage can start, including the book, call-in shows, and a re-play of interesting committee hearings. But the air times for these items don't get posted to the schedule until after the Congressional bodies adjourn, so there is no fixed schedule. It's as if, during the Watergate hearings, there was a live broadcast on a mystery channel that no-one could watch, with random replays late at night on the accessible channel. The priorities are back-asswards, as I find that most live Senate/House coverage is pretty dull.
Comcast has a spot on their website to "request" channels. I did so last summer, again this month. I plan to request monthly, weekly, maybe start writing a letter. Maybe CC the letter to the FCC? But on the C-SPAN website, there is a note that there is a multi-way spat between the FCC and for-profit broadcasters and the cable and dish industry about "access." A polite way of saying they are fighting over allocation of channels and available bandwidth. These fights do not seem to stop Comcast from adding a gazillion for-profit channels that air paid advertising. But to add one more non-advertising channel seems to be more than they want to deliver.
Broadband webcasts? Sure. Except that in a lot of the rural areas, you can't get broadband. Sounds like an equal access issue to me. My family in the plains cannot get DSL, even 300-baud dial-up, because the driveway to the house is 3/4 mile, and phone line quality is poor. Back in the stone-age when I used dial-up at my Northwest suburban home, I could not get my laptop dial-up to work out there, even at 300 baud. DSL is not available there today. Cell phone reception is sketchy. Cable: forget it, they will never run cable to these areas. Satelite internet: yeah right, for a thousand dollars in equipment and $50 to $100 monthly, no.
I could hope that some day Wi-Max will get built out along the state highway and rural towns and provide broadband coverage. Or, that fiber optic will get built out to the rural areas: but the big telco's like Verizon and Sprint sold off their rural wireline subsidiaries long ago: low subscriber base per square mile, low margin business, customers not wanting to pay for the triple-play package.
Tuesday, January 16, 2007
Transcript Senator Voinovich and Secretary Rice 2007-01-11 Sen-FRC
Continuing on from the last posts. The following is an excerpt from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Thursday Jan 11 2007, the day after Bush announced his new Iraq initiative and the imminent deployment of 21,500 more troops overseas. This is the entirety of Sen. George Voinovich's question and answer with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
This is the hearing where you heard the lingusitic shift (or re-write) from "surge of troops" to "augmentation of troops."
This is the hearing where you heard the lingusitic shift (or re-write) from "surge of troops" to "augmentation of troops."
[Sen George Voinovich (R-Ohio)]
Secretary, I'm sorry that I wasn't here for your testimony for the other questions so you'll forgive me if I am going to be redundant. But I met this morning with representatives from ten nations who are concerned about our visa waiver program. And I believe that the current program, and I'm glad the president understands this, needs to be changed, because these people are our allies in helping us in Afghanistan, and Iraq. And I think you know that the most important weapon, I think, in terms of winning the war on terror is public diplomacy, and it needs to be improved substantially. And I'm hoping, Mr. Chairman, that we can get on to this whole issue of visa waiver early on in this session so that we can get it done. And calm down some of our allies that are really upset with us that they can't get their people here into the United States because of this unrealistic program that we have.
I think you should know that I am skeptical that a surge of troops will bring and end to the escalation of violence and the insurgency in Iraq. Many of the generals that have served there have said they don't believe additional troops will be helpful in Baghdad, particularly.
And Madame Secretary, my faith in Prime Minister Maliki's ability to make the hard choices necessary to bring about political solutions has to be restored. What we need is a political solution between the Sunnis and the Shiite. And I've asked this question now for two years. How can you have a unity government, that isn't dominated by the Shiites, that will ultimately get rid of the Sunnis that are in Iraq, when you have Sadr there, Muqtada al-Sadr, who from everything I understand pretty well tells Maliki what to do. We've seen evidence where we've done certain things, he makes a telephone call, and Maliki pulls the plug.
I think that we underestimate the hatred between Sunnis and Shiites. And we're saying that somehow they're all going to get together and everything's going to be happy. The Sunnis and the Baathists kept the Shiites down for many many years, now the Shiites are in the majority. The issue is, are you going to end up with a unity government, or are you going to have another theocracy, like you have in Iran? I think that's what Sadr wants. So, how can you explain to us, that this is all going to be worked out? Probably this article was discussed already this morning, the Fog, David Brooks' article, in the New York Times? [David Brooks: The Fog over Iraq in the NYT and the IHT, Jan 11, 2007]
He says that the plan we're proposing isn't reflecting what Maliki says he wants done. And I'd insist that Maliki gets up and makes it clear to the whole world that this is what he wants done! That he's for it! And this isn't the United States on our own superimposing what we think needs to be done on him. Because I think that if that's not done, every one's going to think, here we go again, the U.S. is in there on their own.
The other question's been raised here, is how much help are we getting from our Sunni friends, there. What have they done to help us? Countries that had been our friends are leaving. Why is it that they're leaving? Have they lost confidence that this dream that we had of a democracy there, which many of us bought into, isn't going to happen? And that it's going to break down into a civil war situation?
And I think the question that all of us have is this: we don't want any more of our young men killed in a civil war between two groups that ultimately are never going to come together. I send letters out to the families and tell them how brave their sons were, that the work they're doing there, and the deaths, were as important as what we had in the second world war. But I have to rewrite the letter today. We're talking now about stability.
We're talking about young men and women. This is a very, very important decision. And I think you're going to have to do a much better job, and so is the president, explaining this to us. You've seen the testimony here among my colleagues.
And I must tell you, I've gone along with the president on this, and I've bought into his dream, and at this stage of the game I don't think it's going to happen.
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
Well thank you Senator. I think that we don't have an option to fail in Iraq. The consequences are too great. And... I just don't think it is true that the Iraqi Sunnis and Shia hate each other to the point that they can't live together... I don't believe that. I do think that there are long pent up tensions and emotions and grievances in that society that come from years of tyranny and it's going to take some time for them to get over it, and I do think they've had a very bad set of circumstances by...
[Sen George Voinovich]
Yes Madame Secretary, but what evidentiary fact do we have that he is going to make the tough political decisions that he has to make. And loose his support from Maliki [???did he mean Maliki loose Sadr support?] and the others...
[Secretary Rice]
Senator, we have from him these assurances. He's going to have to act on them. We're going to know very soon whether or not there is political interference when his forces, and they're his forces, want to go into a neighborhood. And we're going to know very soon whether or not he is carrying through with his view, with what he told us, which is that if you are Sunni or Shia, and you are outside the law and you are killing innocent Iraqis, then you have to pay a price for that. You have to be punished. We're going to know. And American forces, as they flow in over time, will only go to support a policy in which Iraqis are carrying out those obligations.
But I just want to emphasize again. I've heard everybody say, we cannot fail, we cannot fail, we cannot fail. If they are unable to get a hold of the sectarian violence, to show that they can control Baghdad, to establish confidence that they are going to be even-handed, then it's going to be very difficult for them to get...
[Sen George Voinovich]
How can we do it with Sadr? How can we do it with Sadr?
[Secretary Rice]
The Iraqis are going to have to deal with Sadr. And to the degree that Sadr is outside of the political process, and his death squads are engaged in violence, then they are going to have to deal with those death squads. And the Prime Minister has said: nobody and nothing is off limits. We will know, Senator, whether or not they are following through. But we've really got to give him a chance to get ahold of this sectarian violence in their capitol, where it's not Iraqis running down the streets, killing other Iraqi Sunnis and Shia. It is organized death squads, going into neighborhoods and killing Sunnis and Shia. That is what's going on there. And they need to re-establish civil order, and we need to be able to help them do that. That is the purpose of the augmentation of our forces.
Transcript Senator Nelson and Secretary Rice 2007-01-11 Sen-FRC
Continuing on from the last post. The following is an excerpt from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Thursday Jan 11 2007, the day after Bush announced his new Iraq initiative and the imminent deployment of 21,500 more troops overseas. This is the entirety of Sen. Bill Nelson's (D-Florida) question and answer with the Secretary.
[Sen. Bill Nelson (D-Florida)]
Madame Secretary, I have supported you and the administration on the war, and I cannot continue to support the administration's position. I have not been told the truth. I have not been told the truth over and over again by administration witnesses, and the American people have not been told the truth. And I don't come to this conclusion very lightly. Does General Abizaid support an increase in troops?
[Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice]
He does.
[Sen. Bill Nelson]
Well, that's at variance, of course, as you've heard.
[Secretary Rice]
I think Senator, he, first of all, if you look at his testimony, and you look at the next lines of his testimony, he talks about the conditions under which troops might be useful. And in fact, everybody had hoped this would be done with Iraqi forces. It wasn't that we didn't need more forces, it was hoped that we do it with Iraqi forces. And what the Baghdad security plan of the summer showed was that that wasn't possible. Gen. Abizaid and Gen. Casey have been involved in the development of this plan and it is in fact Gen. Casey who presented this option to the president.
[Sen. Bill Nelson]
Well I am looking forward to talking to Gen. Abizaid. He is one of the few that have come before a number of the committees that I have the privilege of sitting on, that I feel like has been a straight shooter. And it's my hope that Chairman Carl Levin will call him and I will ask him directly. But of course I was one of the ones that asked him that question very specifically when he was last here in front of the Congress. And he is someone that I think has credibility but, sad to say, he is one of the few that I felt like I was getting the straight story from.
Let me pick up on something Sen. Coleman said. Three weeks ago we were in Iraq, and our mouths about dropped open when the national security advisor Dr. Rubai [Iraqi interim government National Security Adviser Dr. Muaffaq al-Rubai] said, and I think it's almost his direct quote, this is not a sectarian war. And he went on to talk about how it's extremists, al-Qaeda, and how it's the Ba'thists that want to come back into power. And of course that's part of it. But the two of us, certainly this Senator, got the impression, that they are not coming to grips with what they have to come with. And that is, that you've got Sunnis on Shiites, and Shiites on Shiites, and Sunnis on Sunnis. And until you get to that problem being solved, it's just simply not going to work.
Now I'll tell you one place that I agree with a statement of the President last night. That he was going to send additional troops into Anbar province. I was convinced by the Marine commanders there, as I think Sen. Colewell was as well, that there where you have just a Sunni population, and that the enemy is al-Qaeda, that working with those Sunni tribal leaders with additional American troops, that you can get some progress. But not so in Baghdad. And I'm sad that we've come to this point.
Let me just conclude by asking you. I think it's been said by a number here, and I would like for you to amplify: obviously we need an intense diplomatic effort in the region. One of the points of my trip was at the request of General Hayden to go and talk with the Saudi King, urging them to use their tribal contacts in Iraq to try to get people to come together. Could you outline for the committee, what is the intense diplomatic effort that is going to be taken, and is it being taken simultaneously with the President's plan of the additional troops?
[Secretary Rice]
Senator, it is being taken. I will go out tomorrow night. The group that we are engaging in addition to all the many bilateral engagements we have with the Saudis, with the Kuwaiti's, with the others who can help, the Jordanians, who can help, is through a group called the GCC+2,that is really the appropriate group. We work also with Turkey, very closely on Iraq. We have a problem on the Northern border with the PKK, that Gen. Ralston is trying to resolve.
But I think you would find that first of all there already has been diplomatic effort. We will of course try to intensify that effort to support what the Maliki government is now trying to do to get its sectarian problem under control. Frankly the countries of the region are also watching to see whether this will be an even-handed government in dealing with both Sunnis and Shia. And so, the Maliki government faces, I think, some skepticism not just from Americans and from Iraqis, but also from the region. And we've made that point to them, that they really must deal with the sectarian problem in an even-handed fashion or they are not going to get support from the region.
That said, to the degree that we hear from the Saudis and others their biggest strategic concern is Iran, then they have a very strong incentive to stabilize Iraq so that Iraq is indeed a barrier to Iranian influence in the region, not a bridge.
[Sen. Biden, as the time remaining is 30 seconds]
Quick question please.
[Sen. Bill Nelson]
We need more than engagement. We need to get these countries to act. So how do you get them to act?
[Secretary Rice]
There is an international compact that they've all negotiated. We need to finalize it.
Transcript Senator Biden and Secretary Rice 2007-01-11 Sen-FRC
I became engrossed in the Iraq policy events of last week after President Bush announced (Jan 10 2007) his new Iraq initiative and the planned deployment of 21,500 additional troops in Iraq. This administration action has been called, by more than one Senator and others, possibly the greatest foreign policy blunder in U.S. history. Whether your opinion of the Iraq war is to concur, "disagree and commit," or disagree outright, this is an important inflection point in the Iraq war and I think it is important to record what's going on here; hence this blog.
What follows is a transcript of the exchange between committee chairman Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, appearing at the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing 10:00 AM Thursday 11 January, 2007. Streaming video of this meeting, The Administration's Plan for Iraq, can also be accessed on teh FRC website (just moved since 11 Jan, '07).
The following transcript picks up after they have read their prepared statements at the start of the hearing. I prepared this transcript as best I could from a video recording. I've looked on several Senate and C-SPAN sites but not found full transcripts, including questions and responses, of all the various hearings being conducted. I recorded and have started to transcribe some of the interchanges in the Senate hearings. Some Senators have put their prepared remarks on their web sites or the Sen-FRC site (links below).
Two items stand out for me during the following interchange: the use of the word "census" and the phrase "image in mind."
[Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware)]
... Let me begin. Secretary Rice, last night the preseident said, and I quote, "succeeding
in Iraq requires defending the teritorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of
[extreme] challenges, and that begins with addressing Iran and Syria."
He went on to say "we will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria, and will seek out and destroy networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq. "
Does that mean the President has plans to cross the Syrian and or Iranian border to pursue
those persons or individuals or governments providing that help?
[Secretary Condoleezza Rice]
Mr Chairman, the Chairman the Joint Chiefs was just asked this question and I think he answered it best. What we are really trying to do here is protect our forces. We that we are doing that by seeking out these networks that are operating in Iraq. We are doing it through intelligence. We are then able, as we did on the 21st of December [2006], to go after these groups where we find them. In that case we then asked the Iraqi government to declare them personna nongratta and expel them from the country because they were holding diplomatic passports.
But what is really being contemplated here in terms of these networds is that believe we can do what we need to do inside Iraq. Obviously the president isn't going to rule anything out to protect our troops, but the plan is to take down these networks in Iraq.
The broader point is that we do have and always have had as a country very strong interest and allies in the gulf region. And we do need to work with our allies to make certain that they have the defense capacity that they need against growing Iranian military buildup, that they feel that we are going to be a presence in the Persian Gulf region as we have been, and that we establish confidence with the states with which we have had long aliances, that we will help to defend their interests. And that is what the President had in mind.
[Senator Joseph Biden]
Secretary Rice, do you believe the president has the constitutional authority to pursue across the border into Iraq or Syria the networks in those countries?
[Secretary Rice]
Well, Mr. Chairman, I think I would not like to speculate on the President's constitutional authority, or to try and say anything that certainly would abridge his constitutional authority, which is broad as Commander in Chief.
I do think that everyone will understand that the American people, and I assume the Congress,
expects the President will do what is necessary to protect our forces.
[Senator Joseph Biden]
Madame Secretary, I just want to make it clear, speaking for myself, that if the president
concluded he had to invade Iran or Syria in pursuit of these networks, I believe the present authorization granted the president to use force in Iraq does not cover that, and he does need Congressional authority to do that. I just want to set that marker.
Let me move on. How long do you estimate American forces will be going door-to-door with their Iraqi counterparts in Baghdad, before they can, I believe the phrase is, secure, or clear, hold, and build. What is the estimate of how long it will take to clear, and how long are we prepared to hold American forces in Baghdad that are being surged?
[Secretary Rice]
Well, I can't give you an exact time table on how long operations might take. Let me just note that the Iraqis are in the lead on these Baghdad operations, and I think that one reason that it is extremely important that they are bringing some of their best forces from around Iraq to participate in this, to lead this effort, is that a good deal of the establishing of confidence in these neighborhoods has been done by Iraqis. We will be in support of them.
But I think that it's extremely important to have an image in mind: that it is Iraqis who are expected to take census, after all they are the ones with the linguistic skills to do so, it is Iraqis who are expected to be in these neighborhoods. The problem with previous Baghdad security plans were there weren't enough forces to hold. I think that it is important that it will be a combination of forces: Iraqi forces, army, police, and national police, and local police. But we want to be certain this time that the holding phase lasts long enough for the Iraqis to be able to deal with the perpetrators of the violence. So I don't want to put a time frame on it. Secretary Gates said early today that he expects this to be, of course, a temporary measure, while Iraqi forces are brought up to speed ...
What follows is a transcript of the exchange between committee chairman Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, appearing at the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing 10:00 AM Thursday 11 January, 2007. Streaming video of this meeting, The Administration's Plan for Iraq, can also be accessed on teh FRC website (just moved since 11 Jan, '07).
The following transcript picks up after they have read their prepared statements at the start of the hearing. I prepared this transcript as best I could from a video recording. I've looked on several Senate and C-SPAN sites but not found full transcripts, including questions and responses, of all the various hearings being conducted. I recorded and have started to transcribe some of the interchanges in the Senate hearings. Some Senators have put their prepared remarks on their web sites or the Sen-FRC site (links below).
- Senator Biden's prepared opening remarks, Sen-FRC 2007 Jan 11 10AM;
- Senator Lugar's prepared opening remarks, Sen-FRC 2007 Jan 11 10AM;
- Secretary Condoleezza Rice's prepared opening remarks, Sen-FRC 2007 Jan 11 10AM;
Two items stand out for me during the following interchange: the use of the word "census" and the phrase "image in mind."
[Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware)]
... Let me begin. Secretary Rice, last night the preseident said, and I quote, "succeeding
in Iraq requires defending the teritorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of
[extreme] challenges, and that begins with addressing Iran and Syria."
He went on to say "we will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria, and will seek out and destroy networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq. "
Does that mean the President has plans to cross the Syrian and or Iranian border to pursue
those persons or individuals or governments providing that help?
[Secretary Condoleezza Rice]
Mr Chairman, the Chairman the Joint Chiefs was just asked this question and I think he answered it best. What we are really trying to do here is protect our forces. We that we are doing that by seeking out these networks that are operating in Iraq. We are doing it through intelligence. We are then able, as we did on the 21st of December [2006], to go after these groups where we find them. In that case we then asked the Iraqi government to declare them personna nongratta and expel them from the country because they were holding diplomatic passports.
But what is really being contemplated here in terms of these networds is that believe we can do what we need to do inside Iraq. Obviously the president isn't going to rule anything out to protect our troops, but the plan is to take down these networks in Iraq.
The broader point is that we do have and always have had as a country very strong interest and allies in the gulf region. And we do need to work with our allies to make certain that they have the defense capacity that they need against growing Iranian military buildup, that they feel that we are going to be a presence in the Persian Gulf region as we have been, and that we establish confidence with the states with which we have had long aliances, that we will help to defend their interests. And that is what the President had in mind.
[Senator Joseph Biden]
Secretary Rice, do you believe the president has the constitutional authority to pursue across the border into Iraq or Syria the networks in those countries?
[Secretary Rice]
Well, Mr. Chairman, I think I would not like to speculate on the President's constitutional authority, or to try and say anything that certainly would abridge his constitutional authority, which is broad as Commander in Chief.
I do think that everyone will understand that the American people, and I assume the Congress,
expects the President will do what is necessary to protect our forces.
[Senator Joseph Biden]
Madame Secretary, I just want to make it clear, speaking for myself, that if the president
concluded he had to invade Iran or Syria in pursuit of these networks, I believe the present authorization granted the president to use force in Iraq does not cover that, and he does need Congressional authority to do that. I just want to set that marker.
Let me move on. How long do you estimate American forces will be going door-to-door with their Iraqi counterparts in Baghdad, before they can, I believe the phrase is, secure, or clear, hold, and build. What is the estimate of how long it will take to clear, and how long are we prepared to hold American forces in Baghdad that are being surged?
[Secretary Rice]
Well, I can't give you an exact time table on how long operations might take. Let me just note that the Iraqis are in the lead on these Baghdad operations, and I think that one reason that it is extremely important that they are bringing some of their best forces from around Iraq to participate in this, to lead this effort, is that a good deal of the establishing of confidence in these neighborhoods has been done by Iraqis. We will be in support of them.
But I think that it's extremely important to have an image in mind: that it is Iraqis who are expected to take census, after all they are the ones with the linguistic skills to do so, it is Iraqis who are expected to be in these neighborhoods. The problem with previous Baghdad security plans were there weren't enough forces to hold. I think that it is important that it will be a combination of forces: Iraqi forces, army, police, and national police, and local police. But we want to be certain this time that the holding phase lasts long enough for the Iraqis to be able to deal with the perpetrators of the violence. So I don't want to put a time frame on it. Secretary Gates said early today that he expects this to be, of course, a temporary measure, while Iraqi forces are brought up to speed ...
[Senator Joseph Biden]
Secretary Rice, I think you're right, it's important to have a visual image of what this means. Six point two million people. Civil war, a sectarian war, taking place. And here is what the President said last night, referring to our surge troops. The vast majority of them, five brigades, will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and will be embedded in their formations.
No American should misunderstand what that means. It means that young Marines are going to be standing next to an Iraqi soldier as they break down a door. So, I want to know, and you've answered it, my question related to, how long we think these Marines and these five brigades are going to be kicking in doors, standing on street corners, patrolling neighborhoods, going to second-storey walk-ups, et cetera. And that was the reason for my question. But you're right. It's important we have the correct image of what this is. And that's what it is.
[Secretary Condoleezza Rice]
It is important that we have the correct image, that Iraqis want to have this be their responsibility.
[Sen Joseph Biden]
Are you confident, you personally, Madame Secretary, this is going to be my concluding question, are you confident that Maliki has the capacity to send you a sufficient number of troops that will stay in the lead, that will allow American Marines to feel that their physical security is not being jeopardized merely by being with this brigade of Iraqis? Are you confident they will send a sufficient number, and their best?
[Secretary Condoleezza Rice]
Most importantly, General Casey and our ambassador believe strongly that the Maliki government intends to live up to its obligation...
[Sen Joseph Biden]
But I'm asking you, Secretary...
[Secretary Condoleezza Rice]
I have met Prime Minister Maliki. I was with him in Amman. I saw his resolve. I think he knows that his government is, in a sense, on borrowed time, not just in terms of the American people, but in terms of the Iraqi people.
[Sen Joseph Biden]
But are you confident?
[Secretary Condoleezza Rice]
I am confident.
[Sen Joseph Biden]
Thank you very much.
Monday, January 15, 2007
Getting started
Trying this stuff out for the first time. So much to share, but who cares, really? All I really want is to archive things I think are important, record a stream of consciousness, type up pithy comments, see them published, and have a large Internet search engine company direct ads my way based on what I type. Is this a great country, or what?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)